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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
It might as well be acknowledged at the outset: Plaintiff-appellant l carries a measure of

micro phonic and other personal baggage that renders him unpopular to some people. Disliked,
even. Likewise, the business of raising domestic elk for the purpose of shooting them for sport
in a small space has its detractors, too -- including, generally speaking, the entire Department of
Fish and Game and most of the hunting public.
But the case isn't about personalities or popularity nor, under a government of laws rather
than men and women, can it properly be. The case is about a grandstanding governor's executive
order, issued without any notice or opportunity to be heard, that directed his minions to sally
forth with a helicopter, an airplane and seven three-man "shooter teams" to exterminate a
domestic elk herd as it grazed on a neighbor's pasture after escaping through a bear-caused hole
in the fence. It is fundamentally a case involving the correct application of an unambiguous
statute that, as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of domestic elk
ranching by the Department of Agriculture, gives immunity to licensed wild elk hunters who,
predictably, bag an escaped domestic elk that has been allowed to roam at large for more than a
week during hunting season.

1 Plaintiffs-appellants are husband and wife. Because the case centers almost exclusively on the
husband, they will both be referred to herein as "plaintiff' or "rancher," etc., for the sake of
convemence.
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Defendants and the lower court, however, used the statute to excuse the state-sponsored
slaughter, without notice, opportunity to be heard or even after-the-fact compensation, of
plaintiff's livestock. This was patently in error. Idaho Code § 25-3707 provides:
Domestic cervidae2 shall be, together with their offspring and increases, the
subject of ownership, lien and absolute property rights (the same as purely
domestic animals) in whatever situation, location or condition such animals may
thereafter become, or be, and regardless of their remaining in or escaping from

such restraint or captivity.
Idaho Code § 25-3705A (3) then provides:
(3) Any domestic cervidae, that have escaped the control of the owner or operator
of a domestic cervidae farm or ranch for more than seven (7) days, taken by a
licensed hunter in a manner which complies with title 36, Idaho Code [i.e., the
Fish and Game statutes], and the rules and proclamations of the Idaho fish and
game commission shall be considered a legal taking and neither the licensed
hunter, the state, nor any state agency shall be liable to the owner for killing the
escaped domestic cervidae.
The Department of Agriculture's administrative rule, adopted pursuant to Title 25, Chapter 37, is
equally clear in its protection of both the escaped stock and the lawful hunting public:

05. Capture. In the event that the owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch
is unable to retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, as determined
by the Administrator, the Administrator may effectuate the capture3 of the
escaped domestic cervidae to ensure the health of Idaho's livestock and wild
cervidae populations.

07. Taking of Escaped Domestic Cervidae. A licensed hunter may legally take
domestic cervidae which have escaped from a domestic cervidae ranch only under
the following conditions: (4-6-05)
I.e., elk.
3 Not "slaughter;" not "destruction;" not "extermination."
2
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a. The domestic cervidae has escaped and has not been in the control of the owner
or operator of the domestic cervidae ranch for more than seven (7) days; and(4-605)

b. The hunter is licensed and in compliance with all the provisions of the Idaho
Department of Fish and Game rules and code. (4-6-05)
IDAPA 02.04.19.204. In other words, if an elk rancher fails to get his escaped livestock back in
within a week during hunting season, no one is going to care

or be liable - if/when a licensed

elk hunter shoots it.
From there, the case branches out to the question whether the government's wholesale
destruction of an escaped domestic elk herd (specifically made "livestock" by statute) simply for
being "out" for more than a week entitles the rancher at a bare minimum to reasonable
compensation for the governmental taking of his property. It finally encompasses the question
whether the governor's misapplication of the statute, as claimed authority for his kill order,
violated the clearly established right of ranchers not to have their strays summarily destroyed
without any notice or right to be heard - notwithstanding a huge segment of the voting public's
distaste for this particular stripe of ranching. For now, however, the case simply requires the
pronouncement of this appellate Court whether plaintiff or the defendantsllower court are correct
in their respective assertions of what the statutes do and do not authorize.
Course of proceedings and disposition below.

In August of 2006, about a hundred head of plaintiff's purebred domestic elk got out
through a bear-caused hole in the fence and wandered over to a neighbor's alfalfa stubble, from
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which they were reluctant to leave.

Over the next few weeks plaintiff succeeded, at an

increasing rate, in getting about 40 of them back. On September 7, however, Idaho's thengovernor issued a sensational Executive Order to immediately "shoot on site" all those that
remained out. (R., p. 32-33.) Seven three-man "shooter teams," assisted by a helicopter and an
airplane and a number of invited members of the public, did just that (except for the ones they
scattered deep into the wild). On February 26, 2008, plaintiff filed a verified complaint alleging
eight counts and naming as defendants the State of Idaho, former governor Risch and former
Fish and Game Director Huffaker. (R., p. 15-54).
On January 27, 2009, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12
(b) (6), LR.C.P. (R., p. 55-56). The lower court heard argument on March 19, 2009, at the
conclusion of which it volunteered
"It's an area that I'm very interested in and have been for years. I really enjoy fish
and game law. I think it's fascinating. I also like dealing with fISh and game
people because they're interesting people."
(03-19-2009 Tr., p. 22, L. 22 - p. 23, L. 2.) On April 29, 2009, it granted in part and denied in
part the Rule 12b)(6) motion to dismiss. (R., p. 106-128).4 Defendants then filed an answer with

a counterclaim for the cost of the slaughter (R.,p. 131-138). Plaintiff next brought a motion for

Remarkably, although the lower court correctly understood that "The Court takes the
[plaintiffs'] factual allegations as true, because this is a Motion to Dismiss," (R., p. 107), it
nonetheless declared the following a few pages later: "The question of Governor Risch's
immunity turns on whether it was clearly established in 2006 that Governor Risch's issuance of
an executive order to kill escaped elk believed to be diseased to protect the health of wild elk
herds or the public violated the [plaintiffs] constitutional rights to property and due process. The
Court concludes that it was not." (R., p. 119-120.) The "believed to be diseased" assertion was
certainly not from any allegation of the complaint and it hadn't even been suggested by anyone,
4
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leave to file an amended complaint which the court granted from the bench at its November 12,
2009, hearing (11-12-2009 Tr., p. 8, L. 21-p. IS, L. 19), closing, again, with

"I also have a Fish and Game background, so I know a little about Elk."
(Tr. p.17, L. 4-S).
The amended complaint was filed (R., p. 146-170) and defendants answered and
reasserted their counterclaim (R., p. 171-181), following which they moved for summary
judgment (R., p. 182-183).

As a motion for summary judgment, it had a striking singularity:

Nowhere is there even any assertion of purportedly uncontroverted facts and its supporting
"Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" simply attaches
pages from the depositions of plaintiff and his wife (R., p. 189-209); a "discovery document" that
has no foundation whatsoever but which, if true and authentic indicates the only domestic elk the
State ever killed before plaintiffs had in fact - unlike plaintiffs perfectly healthy herd - been
exposed to disease. (R., p. 211.) It also attached a copy of one of the involved statutes, Idaho
Code § 2S-370SA. That was it.
Plaintiff opposed the motion with, among other things: (1) the deposition of Dr. Greg
Ledbetter, D.V.M., former State Veterinarian and the actual Administrator of the Department of
Agriculture, Division of Animal Industries (to which all jurisdiction over domestic elk had been
transferred from Fish and Game by the Legislature in 1994) who testified there was an open and

anywhere, in the case. The court also declared, at n. 7, R., 114, that "The Court also notes that
there is the common law doctrine of nuisance abatement," which similarly does not appear to
have been suggested by anyone. Nor does it appear the court's pronouncements at n. 13, R., p.
116 and at n. 16, R., p. 122, involving immunity for acts done pursuant to unconstitutional
statutes or ordinances, were responsive to any assertions of the parties.
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serious institutional bias against elk ranching at Fish and Game, that the governor consulted
only with Fish and Game but not the Department of Agriculture before issuing his kill order and
that the State had never before simply exterminated escaped but healthy elk; (2) exhibits to Dr.
Ledbetter's deposition, including a state-produced Power Point document that included under the
heading "What Went Wrong" the bullet point "the executive order was issued based on biased
information" (R., p. 266-277; 296); (3) defendants' unsworn answer to an interrogatory, signed
only by their defense counsel, that, over four years after the event, the authorship of the "What
Went Wrong" Power Point document was still "unknown" to defendants but that "if and when
the information requested in this interrogatory is learned, it will be seasonably disclosed pursuant
to applicable rule or court order" (R., p. 299); (4) the deposition of Kelly Mortensen, one of the
Department of Agriculture's livestock investigators who inspected plaintiffs facility fence on
June 27, 2006, and found it to be in compliance with the applicable regulations (R., 306-311); (5)
the testimony of plaintiff that he had been to his facility on August 11, 2006, to water the stock
and check the fence and saw nothing out of order (R., p. 189);

(6) the Rule 36 admission of

defendants that from 2002 up to the time of the subject escape, the Department of Agriculture
reported there were 164 escapes from 13 different certified facilities in Idaho with 142 retrieved,
12 killed by their owners and 10 unaccounted for (R., p. 331) and (7) the deposition of Mark
Hyndman, the Department of Agriculture's livestock investigator for just shy of 30 years, who
testified it was not unexpected for domestic elk to get out, that when they did get out the rancher
usually got them back in eventually and that he had never been involved with the state killing
escaped domestic elk other than plaintiff's (R., p. 301-305).
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Plaintiff also filed an opposing brief focusing on the Legislature's enactment of an entire
statutory scheme for the management of domestic elk that: (1) transferred all responsibility
from the Department of Fish and Game to the Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal
Industries (of which Dr. Ledbetter was the Administrator); (2) specifically made domestic elk
"livestock" exactly the same as domestic cattle, etc.; (3) authorized the State to do nothing more
than effectuate capture and the imposition of civil fines if escaped domestic elk remained out for
a period that was longer than "timely," as determined by the Administrator on a case-by-case

basis; and (4) immunized lawful hunters from liability for shooting an escaped domestic elk
that had been "out" more than seven days during hunting season. (R., p. 343-360). Although
plaintiff anticipates cannibalizing as much as possible from that brief into this one, the Court and
its law clerks are implored to review that brief closely and then compare it with the lower court's
remarks from the bench at the December 16,2010, hearing on the motion. It does not appear the
court gave it any consideration at all.
At the hearing, the court delivered its lengthy bench ruling whereby it granted all of the
relief sought by the defendants. In addition, it invited them several times to seek attorney fees as
well - just before announcing, for the second time, its former role "as a fISh and game attorney
and constitutional attorney." (12-16-2010 Tr., p. 24, L. 24 - p. 53, L. 17.)

The court gave no

treatment whatsoever to the actual language of the controlling statutes, other than to declare they
authorized what the governor had done - a position oddly inconsistent with what it had written
earlier in its "Order Re: Motion to Dismiss":
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Finally, even the language of I.C. § 25-3705A itself appears to indicate an
intention to insulate licensed hunters, and the state agencies who licensed those
hunters, from liability for inadvertently killing and taking domestic cervidae that
have escaped for more than seven (7) days, not to serve as a codification of a
version of the public necessity doctrine.
R., p. 114, emphasis added.
It was as if the court had become so immersed in its mulling of the constitutional issues

that it simply couldn't detach the analysis from them in order to analyze what it was the
Legislature actually had and hadn't done in its enactment of the elk ranching statutes. This had
been foretold earlier when, after the parties had filed their supporting and opposing briefs, the
court called a status conference at which it instructed counsel to brief the motion again, this time
to include the question whether I.C. §25-3705A (with its "seven day" provision) is constitutional

- a question the court had itself specifically volunteered, in its earlier order on the 12 (b)(6)
motion, would be deemed wholly irrelevant:
Furthermore, even if this section is ultimately determined to be unconstitutional,
Governor Risch and Director Huffaker were entitled to act in reliance on this
statute. Idaho Code § 6-611 immunizes public officers from civil liability for
actions performed under any statute even if the statute is subsequently declared by
judicial determination to be unconstitutional.

April 29, 2009 Order Re: Motion to Dismiss, n. 17, emphasis added. (R., p. 120.) Given the
probable constitutionality of the statute in its immunization of licensed hunters who shoot
escaped domestic elk allowed to roam the wilds during hunting season, and given the court's
prior pronouncement that even if unconstitutional the fact wouldn't help plaintiff any, the request
to brief the seven-day provision's constitutionality was almost bait-like. In addition, the court
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requested further briefing on the objective standard (to the exclusion of subjective state of mind)
applicable to the defendants' qualified immunity defense to plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim,
reprising the significance of its earlier (and unalleged, wholly unsupported and incorrect)
assertion in its "Order Re: Motion to Dismiss" (R., p. 119-120) that plaintiffs livestock were
"believed to be diseased." Plaintiff obliged with a Second Brief in Opposition to Summary
Judgment (R., p. 380-413), which the Court and its law clerks are also implored to review and
compare with the lower court's bench ruling and comments.

It, too, appears to have been

completely ignored.
In addition, plaintiff filed a second affidavit of record presenting additional deposition
testimony from plaintiff and from defendant/former Fish and Game Director Steve Huffaker.
Mr. Huffaker testified that in that capacity he had heard "loud and clear" the calls of several
sportsman's groups for the actual elimination of domestic elk ranching:

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

51
Q. Do you recall any -- anyone asking you for
a strong department position on elk farming?
A. You know, I -- I -- four years ago, I
don't remember any specifics; but I can tell you that
there were people in the department who felt that we
should have a -- we should have a department position,
if you would, on the issue to represent sportsmen.
Q. And the position that those folks were
lobbying for was anti-domestic elk ranching, wasn't
it?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in this e-mail exchange that's marked
Exhibit 12 to your deposition the other communication
is from Donna Dillon, and she's forwarded it to
herself; and her title at the end of it is "Donna
Dillon, Administrative Assistant, Idaho Department of
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52
1 Fish and Game, Bureau of Communications. "
2
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Let's start with who Donna Dillon is and
3
4 what was her job. Who was she administrative
5 assistant to, I guess?
A. She was the administrative assistant to
6
7 the bureau chief of the Bureau of Communications, and
8 I believe at that time that was Roger Fuhrman, but I'm
9 not sure. I -- I don't remember the -- for sure who
10 was there, but I think it was Roger at that time.
Q. We see him copied on some ofthese
11
12 e-mails -- I guess not this one -- but that seems
13 consistent.
Now, Ms. Dillon, the administrative
14
assistant,
attaches an article from The Rexburg
15
16 Standard Journal entitled "Group wants to curtail elk
17 hunting operations," and in that article that she
18 attaches the statement is made as well: "•.. the

19 state should phase out such existing operations. "
Do you know what that -- why Ms. Dillon is
20
21 attaching this article where someone is calling for
22 the state to phase out existing operations?
A. The procedure -- or the -- one of the
23
24 things that the Bureau of Communications was doing,
25 and probably is still doing as far as I know, is they

53
1 are going through a clipping service.
And if they find articles relevant to
2
3 wildlife management, fisheries management, and fish
4 and wildlife in the state ofIdaho, they justforward

5 them to all the regions and a - a long list of
6 department employees so they're informed on the issue.
7
Q. While you-8
A. But-9
Q. Go ahead.
l O A . I mean that's what this appears to me to
11 be.
12
Q. Okay. While you were director ofthe
13 Idaho Department of Fish and Game in 2006, were you
14 aware of calls from different groups for the
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15 elimination of domestic elk ranching in Idaho?
A. Loud and ciear,yes.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1

Q. Can you tell me who primarily those groups
were?
A. Hunting groups. I know the Idaho
Sportsmen Caucus Advisory Committee was advising
legislators that they should intervene in domestic elk
ranching, particularly shooter bull ranching; and the
Idaho Wildlife Federation is one of the bigger
sportsmen's groups in the state. They were very

adamant.
54
But there were individuals from a number

2
3
4
5

of organizations: Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation,
Safari Club, Deer Hunters of Idaho and et cetera, et
cetera, et cetera. A lot of hunters felt very
strongly that this wasn't something that Idaho needed.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Would this represent a significant part of
the Idaho electorate that was opposed?
A. I would have no idea about the general
electorate. That -- that -- I was hearing from
sportsmen. The department was receiving input from
sportsmen primarily.
Q. And you say they were adamant?
A. Pretty adamant, yes.
(Exhibit 13 was marked for identification
and a copy is attached hereto.)
BY MR. FUREY:
Q. Mr. Huffaker, handing you what has been
marked as Exhibit 13 to your deposition, which is
another apparent news article, carrying Bates Nos. PLF
02087 and concluding with Bates PLF 02089.
On the second page of it at PLF 02088,
there's a purported quote from you; and I don't know
if it's accurate or not, but that's what I'll ask
you. You're quoted as saying -- and this is about a
third of the way up from the bottom of the page:
55

1

2
3

"I've never been a big fan of
domestic elk. I figure elk are in
the wild and that's the way God made
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4

them."

5
6
A.
7
Q.
8
A.
9
Q.
lOA.

Were you accurately quoted there?
Probably.
Okay.
I don't remember saying it, but-But is it consistent with your views?

It would be consistent, yes.

(Huffaker depo., 51/10-55/1, R., p. 419-422). Could a highly publicized opportunity to wipe
one of these outfits off the map in spectacular fashion possibly be any more tempting to a
politician looking to jump from the governor's office to the U.S. Senate?
On December 16, 2010, the lower court heard argument on the motion for summary
judgment.

That is, it heard argument when it wasn't interrupting defense counsel to offer

suggestions or interrupting plaintiffs counsel to help argue the defendants' case - even to the
point of mis-stating plaintiffs insistently made argument that the seven-day immunity for
licensed hunters during hunting season (not the State or its politicians) was clear and controlling:
THE COURT [to defendants' counsel]: Do you have any response to apparently

his basic claim that he's making is the statute is ambiguous.
MR. FUREY:
THE COURT:
MR. FUREY:
MR. KELLY:

* *

Not all, Your Honor.
Or does not say what the State says it says.
Thank you.
Well,just briefly, Your Honor.

*

12-16-2010 Tr., p. 38, L. 6 - 15. Neither the court nor defendants' counsel ever did address the
actual wording of the "seven day" provision or the "timely, as determined by the Administrator"
provision. Finally, the court dispensed its own declared expertise concerning inbreeding (12-162010 Tr., p. 37, L. 14) and "genetic drift" (12-16-2010 Tr., p. 37, L. 16), which subjects appear
nowhere else in the entire record.
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The court then delivered from the bench its oral decision granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment, (12-16-2010 Tr., p. 39, L. 8 - p. 52, L. 6), following which it made a
couple or three invitations to the defendants to seek an award of attorney fees (12/16/2010 Tr., p.
52, L. 6-8; L. 21-22; p. 55, L. 3-8), explicitly declaring "a signal to the [plaintiff] that I'm
inclined to grant" such a request if the defendants would only make it. (12/16/2010 Tr. p. 55, L.
10-16.) Finally, the court closed with still another reminder of earlier days in the service of Fish
and Game:
"The issues are interesting and it did bring me back to my days as a fISh and
game attorney and constitutional attorney."
12/16/2010 Tr., p. 53, L. 14 - 15.

Defendants accepted the court's invitation to request an award of attorney fees, of course,
but in their haste to fashion a club with which to beat plaintiff out of appealing, they included a
fee bill from their prior counsel which included the following:

REVIEW EMAIL FROM DALLAS BURKHALTER,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, EXPRESSING
CONCERNS REGARDING THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
AND SUBSEQUENT LIABILITY FOR LAWSUIT

(R., p. 585). The "concerns of the assistant attorney general regarding the executive order and

subsequent liability for lawsuit" pretty clearly cut against the lower court's and new defense
counsel's view that the case was "frivolous" and "without basis" in law or fact. Just before that,
however, matters had become downright disturbing: When plaintiff called the hollow bluff of
defendants' counterclaim, which sought purely economic loss for "negligence" based on a hole in
the fence caused by a bear (01106/2011 Tr., p. 56, L. 17- p. 57, L. 1; R., p. 418, 199-200), they
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folded their tents on the eve of trial and themselves moved for dismissal of their counterclaim,
outright and for no consideration whatsoever. (R., p. 476-481.)

5

But as if defense counsel

feared the court might somehow not grasp his clients' desire for a big fee award as a chip to trade
for an appeal, he actually stated the following in his affidavit in support of defendants' motion to
dismiss their counterclaim:
That efforts have also been made to dismiss this Counterclaim in exchange for
the PlaintifflCounterdefendants' waiver of their right to appeal this Court's
Order entered on January 7, 2011 on the State's Motion for Summary Judgment.
These efforts however, have been unsuccessful;
R., p. 479, emphasis added. Plaintiff then moved, pointedly, to disallow the fees and costs
claimed by defendants, which the court granted in part but denied in a roughly $50,000.00 part
(R., 675-685), reiterating the conviction it had for all of its earlier pronouncements. It eschewed
any treatment whatsoever, though, of the language of the applicable statutes or the following
point made in plaintiffs supporting brief:
And for all of the Court's insistence that Idaho Code § 25-3705A(3) was intended
to authorize the gang-slaughter of domestic elk instead of to immunize the
innocent hunter who kills a beautiful domestic trophy bull during hunting season,
the Court should reflect on the fact no appellate Court in Idaho has ever said that.
And that makes the whole punitive attorney fee thing more than just a little
distasteful. The Rincover case cited by defendants observed:
SPlaintiff had advised defendants to go ahead and try their counterclaim to a jury as scheduled,
rather than to the court as they had recently requested. (01106/2011 Tr., p. 57, L. 7-17.) In
response to plaintiffs pretrial need only for defendants' verification of their answers to
interrogatories and about a 45-minute deposition of the actual Bureau Chief in charge of the
domestic elk program (Dr. Lawrence, who had been declared more "unavailable" than the fee bill
entries show [ R., p. 616-619]), the court offered the following: "I'll tell you, Mr. Furey, I'm kind
of concerned about increasing costs, because, as I told - as I told you, there's a strong possibility
that I would grant the State their attorney's fees and at this point they're not insubstantial. I can
only guess." (01106/2011 Tr., p. 60, L. 19-24.)
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The Department relied on particular provisions of I.C. § 301413 FN2 to justifY these reasons. At the time, the specific
provisions in I.C. § 30-1413 which were relied upon by the
Department had not been construed by the courts. While the
district court below disagreed with the Department's interpretation
and application of those provisions to the facts presented by
Wanda's case, see Rincover v. State, Dep't of Finance, 129 Idaho at
443, 926 P.2d at 627, it does not appear that the Department's
action was unreasonable under the circumstances. In Re Russet
Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 904 P.2d 566 (1995); Central
Paving Co. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 126 Idaho 174, 879 P.2d 1107
(1994). The Department did not act without or contrary to statutory
authority, or ignore or refuse to comply with duties imposed by
statute. We cannot say that the action by the Department was
groundless or arbitrary or required Wanda to bear an unfair or
unjustified expense in an attempt through judicial review to correct
an agency mistake that should never have been made. Accordingly,
we hold that the district court **477 *551 did not err by denying
the request for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 to
Wanda Rincover.
Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau 132 Idaho 547, 550-551,
976 P.2d 473,476 - 477 (Idaho,1999).
(R., p. 609-610, emphasis added.) Plaintiff timely appealed. (R., p. 660.) He hereby waives the

dismissal of his emotional distress claims as an issue on appeal.
Statement of Facts

Idaho's elected Legislature has chosen to make the ranching of elk6 every bit as legal and indeed condoned - as the ranching of cattle. Idaho Code, Title 25 (Animals), Chapter 37
(Domestic Cervidae Farms). They specifically made them "livestock," I.C. § 25-3701, and they
even put in a "we're not kidding" provision for good measure:
6

Scientific name: "cervidae."
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Domestic cervidae shall be, together with their offspring and increases, the
subject of ownership, lien and absolute property rights (the same as purely
domestic animals) in whatever situation, location or condition such animals may
thereafter become, or be, and regardless of their remaining in or escaping from
such restraint or captivity.

I.e. § 25-3707. 7

This was done back in 1994 and it looks, in hindsight, as if they saw this very

case - and court below - coming and determined to do all they possibly could to head the case and the lower court - off.
In the summer of 2006, Plaintiff owned about 150 head of healthy, purebred, Rocky
Mountain elk which were confined to his elk ranch by a good-condition, regulation, mesh wire
fence. (Verified Amended Complaint, R., p. 146-170; Mortensen depo., 10/23-13/1 0, R. p. 310).
On August 14, Dr. Debra Lawrence - Assistant State Veterinarian and Bureau Chief, Animal
Industries and the person primarily in charge of the whole domestic elk program8

--

called

plaintiff to advise that a neighbor had complained about a number of his elk that had wandered
over to graze on her pasture. According to Administrator Ledbetter:
19
24
Q. Okay. And ifI understand the records
25 correctly, and I think I do, Ms. Albertson called your
20
1 subordinate, Dr. Lawrence, and reported the presence
2 of these animals in her alfalfa pasture, right?

The statutes, together with the pertinent administrative regulations, are attached for convenience
as an Appendix.
7

Whose deposition plaintiff desired to take before the scheduled trial of defendants'
counterclaim; whose name the lower court didn't recognize even after all of the summary
judgment briefing and whose relevancy to the case the lower court professed not to see. (January
6,2011 Tr., p. 59, L. 5 - p. 60, L. 24.)
8
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3
4
5
6
7

A. Yeah. Deb was -- Dr. Lawrence was
primarily in charge of the Cervidae program, the
recordkeeping, you know, just making sure that all the
ends came together. And so, yes, she was the one that
took the calL

Ledbetter depo., 19124 - 2017. (R., p. 270.)
Livestock get out. Ranchers get them back in. It is always a headache and it sometimes
takes time, but it gets done.

This is because no one kills them or drives them irretrievably off

with S.W.A.T. teams, helicopters and airplanes - except in this case.
Sportsmen's groups and the Department of Fish and Game have long been openly and
passionately opposed to elk ranching. (Huffaker Depo. 51110 - 5511, R., p. 114.)

"It's just not

natural," seems to be the common prejudice - except in the Legislature, where it was given the
same status as any other form of ranching. Plaintiffs' ranch was stocked with purebred animals
brought into the state in compliance with the statutory and regulatory procedures designed to
ensure genetic purity and freedom from disease. Those raised on the ranch as their issue had
been tested and found, likewise, to be free from disease. Records of this were on file with the
Department of Agriculture at the time of the events in question.

Verified First Amended

Complaint, paras. 24 and 25. (R., p. 151-152.) Plaintiffs' ranch, including its regulation meshwire fence, were inspected by the Division of Animal Industries and found to be in good repair
on June 27,2006. (Mortensen Depo. Exh. 7, Bates No. PLF 00117, R., p. 313, 314.)
Plaintiff was on his premises Friday, August 11, 2006, to water the stock and check the
fence; he saw nothing out of order. (R., 189 - 197.) Sometime before August 14, however,
some 100-plus head of his stock got out through a bear-caused hole in the fence, whereupon
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they wandered over to the neighbor's alfalfa stubble to graze. The neighbor called Animal
Industries to complain, whereupon Dr. Lawrence (Bureau Chief, Animal Health) called plaintiff,
who immediately fixed the hole and began getting his stock back in. (R., p. 314.) He worked
steadily at it for a couple of weeks and, at the suggestion of someone from Animal Industries that
he try chumming the remaining animals in with grain, his rate of success was even increasing.
He had over half his stock back in when the government shooters arrived. (R., p. 189 - 197.)
Defendant Risch had been Governor for about five months, succeeding to the post after
Dirk Kempthorne stepped down to accept an appointment as Secretary of the Interior.

On

September 7,2006, having consulted with the ranch-opposed Idaho Sportsmen's Caucus and Fish
and Game - but not the Administrator of the Division or Bureau Chief Lawrence 9 - Risch issued
his sensational Executive Order commanding Fish and Game to immediately "shoot on site" all
of plaintiffs remaining strays. (R., p. 32-33.) This was accompanied by much fanfare but no
evidence whatsoever of any genetic impurity or disease, nor even by so much as any suggestion
of any reasonable suspicion, let alone "belief," ofany genetic impurity or disease. 10

9 The State Veterinarian and Assistant State Veterinarian, respectively. Ledbetter Depo., R., p.
266 - 272. See, I.C § 25-202.

As mentioned earlier, there is a statement in the Court's April 29, 2009, Order on defendants'
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, at 14 - 15, that the question of Governor Risch's immunity
"turns on whether it was clearly established in September 2006 that Governor Risch's issuance of
an executive order to kill escaped elk believed to be diseased [in order] to protect the health of
wild elk herds or the public violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights to property and due process."
This is simply wrong, and it represents an example of the plain error that attended the naked,
self-serving, presumptions the defendants put forth for the court to absorb without evidence.
There has never in this case, and certainly not on the motion to dismiss, been any evidence that
anybody actually "believed" or even so much as suspected that these highly prized, extremely
10
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Defendant Huffaker, director of Fish and Game, then dispatched seven "shooter teams"
comprised of two shooters and one spotter each, along with a helicopter and an airplane. (R., p.
452-454.) What the "shooter teams" couldn't kill were, naturally enough, driven irretrievably
deep into the wild by these eager "teams," the weapons fire, the chopper and the airplane.
(plaintiff depo., 63/1-65/2, R., p. 196-197.) Plaintiff was given no opportunity whatsoever to be
heard, and defendants have admitted in their briefing that (a) the state deliberately destroyed
plaintiffs' property, (b) the state has at all times from the beginning intended not to compensate
plaintiffs for the property destroyed or - to the same effect - driven irretrievably from the
neighbor's hay field deep into the wild and (c) they wouldn't alter their behavior if they had it to
do again. And this despite the uncontroverted facts that plaintiffs had
operated and maintained a disease-free, genetically pure herd since acquisition of
the herd in 1994 and have records validating this claim for each and every animal
of Plaintiffs' elk herd. These records had been provided to. and were on file

with. the Idaho Department o(Agriculture prior to August. 2006.
First Amended Complaint, paragraph 25 (verified). (R., p. 152.)
In their initial summary judgment brief at 17 (R., p. 230) , defendants eliminated the possibility of
any doubt whatsoever as to what sort of case this is:

valuable, purebred, veterinarian-owned livestock were "diseased." And in fact, the only
evidence extant is that every time the animals were tested by the Division of Animal Industries,
they tested spotlessly healthy. This gratuitous error may have been the font of defendants'
otherwise curious summary judgment briefing devoted in so large a measure to the off-point
topic of a State's authority to abate nuisances. Until the lower court's order on the motion to
dismiss, no one in the case had ever even suggested that escaped livestock constitute a public
nUIsance. And in fact an entire chapter of Title 25, i.e., Chapter 23, "Estrays," makes plain they
are not.
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Paragraph 4 of the Executive Order which authorized the taking of the
escaped domestic elk from the [plaintiffs] facility declared as follows:
4. Pursuant to title 25, section 3705A of the Idaho Code no licensed hunter,
state agency, state employee of the State shall be liable for the taking possessing or
consuming of any domestic elk that have escaped from the Conant Creek Facility;
See, I.C. § 25-3705A, attached as Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Michael E. Kelly:

The executive order, as based upon this statue, made it clear that the state
of Idaho intentionally authorized the "take" of the animals that had escaped from
the [plaintiffs '1 domestic elk farm, without the payment of any compensation to the
[plantiffsJ for any of those animals that were subsequently taken as a result of that
hunt.

Their own words. Defendants' initial brief in support of summary judgment at 17, emphasis added
(R., p. 230.) They framed their own summary judgment issue as follows, too:
The question that is now renewed on this motion for summary judgment is
whether the [plaintiffs] can sustain their taking claims in the face of evidence
presented by the defendants that the [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture their escaped
animals within a reasonable time created a public nuisance that the defendants were
entitled to abate without the payment of any compensation to the [plaintiffs].
Defendants' initial brief in support of summary judgment at 16, emphasis added. (R., p. 229.)
And without any notice or opportunity to be heard, and without any determination by the
Administrator (Dr. Ledbetter) of what amount of time would be "reasonable", and without any
effort by the state to "capture" the escaped livestock, either.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Idaho Legislature, in its enactment of Title 25, Chapter 37 of the

Idaho Code for the purpose of governing the industry of elk ranching, intended for I.C. § 25-
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3705A to authorize the State's summary slaughter of healthy elk that have escaped the confines
of their ranch for more than seven days, without notice to the rancher or opportunity for him to
be heard, without any determination of "timeliness" by the Administrator of the Department of
Agriculture, Division of Animal Industries, without any attempt at capture and without the
payment of reasonable compensation.
2.

Whether genuine issues of material fact precluded entry of summary judgment on

the proposition defendants presented to the court below, viz:
The question that is now renewed on this motion for summary judgment is
whether the [plaintiffs] can sustain their taking claims in the face of evidence
presented by the defendants that the [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture their escaped
animals within a reasonable time created a public nuisance that the defendants were
entitled to abate without the payment of any compensation to the [plaintiffs].
Defendants' initial brief in support of summary judgment at 16, emphasis added. CR., p. 229.)
3.

Whether the State's intentional taking of plaintiffs livestock entitles him to

reasonable compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
4.

Whether genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for

defendant Risch on plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for violation of plaintiffs clearly
established right to the ownership and enjoyment of his livestock.
5.

Whether the lower court's award of attorney fees to defendants on the ground

plaintiffs case was pursued "frivolously" and "without any basis in law or fact" was plain error.
6.

Whether, given the passionate animosity of the Department of Fish and Game for

elk ranching and given the lower court's declared prior experience "as a fish and game attorney
and constitutional attorney" this case should be reassigned on remand.
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ARGUMENT
The Idaho Legislature, in its enactment of Title 25, Chapter 37 of the Idaho Code
1.
for the purpose of governing the industry of elk ranching, did not intend for I.e. § 253705A to authorize the State's summary slaughter of healthy elk that have escaped the
confines of their ranch for more than seven days, without notice to the rancher or
opportunity for him to be heard, without any determination of "timeliness" by the
Administrator of the Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal Industries, without
any attempt by the State at capture and without the payment of reasonable compensation.

From September 7, 2006, to the present motion for summary judgment, the defendants
have espoused the premise that I.C. § 25-3705A (3) authorized the State to destroy plaintiffs'
livestock - without notice and without the opportunity to be heard and without any compensation
therefor - simply for being "out" more than a week:
"The State of Idaho has an expressly-stated statutory policy of allowing the owner
of escaped domestic elk a seven day period in which to recapture those animals.
After that time period elapses the state is empowered to take whatever actions are
necessary to either recapture the animals or to destroy them. The statute that
most specifically addresses this question allows for the escaped elk to be shot and
taken by both private and state hunters, without payment of compensation to the
owner. I.C. § 25-3705A(3). Regulations adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture implement this statute. See, IDAPA 02.04.19.204.05 & .07.
The [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture all of their escaped elk in the time allowed
under Idaho law created a public nuisance that could be abated by the state
without the need to compensate the {plaintiffs} for those animals that were
taken. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted to the state of Idaho on
Count I of the Rammells' First Amended Complaint."
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Defendants' (first) Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 22, emphasis added. (R.
p.235.)
"The State of Idaho's enactment and enforcement of I.C. § 25-3705A
encompasses an exercise of the police power for the protection of the public
welfare in respect to both the regulation of domestic cervidae farms and the
protection of the state's wildlife. Subsection (3) ofI.C. § 25-3705A declares that,
[pivotal opening clause omitted} 'neither the licensed hunter, the state, nor any
state agency shall be liable to the owner for the killing of the escaped domestic
cervidae.' "
Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 12 (R., p. 378).
Omitted from the defendants' quotation set out above was the crucial first clause of the statute
that specifies the circumstances in which the immunity obtains:
"Any domestic cervidae that have escaped the control of the owner or operator of
a domestic cervidae farm or ranch for more than seven (7) days, taken by a
licensed hunter in a manner which complies with title 36, Idaho Code, and the
rules and proclamations of the Idaho fish and game commission shall be
considered a legal taking ... "
In that event, and no other, is the escaped livestock "fair game."
After the parties had filed their first briefs supporting and opposing summary judgment,
the lower court called a status conference at which it advised counsel of numerous cases
involving constitutional law and offered its preliminary thought that if I.C. §25-3705A is
constitutional, "then the case could be at an end." It then requested additional briefmg as to
whether I.e. § 25-3705A is constitutional.

Because the statute most likely is constitutional if

read with its pivotal first clause, plaintiff included the following in the requested second brief:
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The Court requested briefing as to whether I.C. § 25-3705A is
constitutional and offered its preliminary thought that if it is constitutional, then
the case could be at an end. It is respectfully submitted the Court must first
determine whether I.C. § 25-3705A truly authorized the defendants' acts at all
because if not, then the constitutionality of the statute itself simply isn't an issue
before Court. Plaintiffs submit the Court's determination whether I.C. § 253705A truly authorized the very deliberate decision of defendants to "shoot on
[sight]" plaintiffs' valuable stray livestock - (1) absent any evidence of disease or
genetic impurity; (2) absent any belief there existed any disease or genetic
impurity; (3) absent any evidence to support even a reasonable suspicion of
disease or genetic impurity, (4) absent any legislative finding of nuisance, (5)
absent any notice to plaintiffs and the opportunity to be heard and (6) in the face
of the actual fact plaintiffs were systematically succeeding in getting their stock
off the neighbor'S hay pasture and back on their own ranch - is a threshold issue if
the Court has any inclination at all to accept as correct defendants' position quoted
above. If the statute doesn't really bless such a grotesque departure from the law
governing all other stray livestock, then the Court isn't presented with that
constitutional issue and it has no place here. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854,
105 S.Ct. 2992, 2997 (1985); Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,
105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944). See Rochin v.California, 342 U.S.
165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952) (criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary differ
depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer
that is at issue).
A.
It is crucial to the correct disposition of this case to dispense with the
defendants' long-running yet never directly addressed "implication" that
I.e. § 25-3705A authorized the summary destruction of plaintiffs' property.

This case can no longer abide the gaping hole in defendants' position:
They simply present it as ipse dixit that the applicable regulations and statutes
authorized their conduct, whereupon they then proceed to hijack the case onto a
tangent devoted to what is in fact a purely hypothetical question: "Does a state
have the right, pursuant to its police power, to terminate property rights where the
continued enjoyment of the property has been legislatively determined to be a
public nuisance?"
Probably so, but that isn't this case, and submitting to the exercise urged
by defendants would take the case down an academically interesting - but
completely inapposite - trail to determine the existence and validity of the police
power, the presumption of constitutionality of legislation, the construction of
statutes to avoid constitutional issues where reasonably possible, and so on.
Defendants' approach is as fraught with error as if, having shot a pulled-over
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motorist for speeding, the defendants sought to divert the Court's analysis to a
focused study of whether the state can constitutionally set its own speed limits
and pull motorists over for exceeding them. The correct place to start is clearly
with exposure of the reality that the statute never authorized what actually was
done in the first place.
Plaintiffs' Second Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 8 - 10. (R., p. 387 - 389.) The
court was unmoved, however, and instead said all it said at the December 16, 2010, hearing.
This statute doesn't require any construction, because its wording plenty clear to convey
its meaning. The rules that apply to statutory construction, however, are surely helpful to expose
the charade of taking I.C. §25-3705A (3) out of context and using it as an excuse to destroy a
legitimate if hated business. When interpreting a statute, the appellate court strives to ascertain
and give effect to the legislative intent for its enactment:
When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to
the legislature's intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc.,
125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations
omitted). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).
However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must engage in statutory
construction. Id When engaging in statutory construction, this Court has a "duty
to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent." Id "[T]he Court
must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable statutes
together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 870
P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all
other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the
policy behind the statute." Id

Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263, 207 P.3d 988,994 (2009).

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 25

There's no ambiguity here. The worst that can be said ofI.C. §25-3705A (3) is that it
might not take the cup in a word smithing pageant:

* * *

(3) Any domestic cervidae, that have escaped the control of the owner or operator
of a domestic cervidae farm or ranch for more than seven (7) days, taken by a
licensed hunter in a manner which complies with title 36, Idaho Code, and the
rules and proclamations of the Idaho fish and game commission shall be
considered a legal taking and neither the licensed hunter, the state, nor any state
agency shall be liable to the owner for killing the escaped domestic cervidae.

Subsection (3)'s meaning, however, is unmistakable: If a rancher doesn't get his stray elk in
promptly (i.e., within a week) during hunting season and a licensed hunter happens to bag it
instead of a wild one, too bad. Otherwise, the rancher would have no real motive to get his stray
stock back in and the hunter would have to agonize whether the trophy bull in his sights will get
him a mention in Boone and Crocket or a mention in court. Bad for hunting and thus bad for
Idaho's economy.
On the other hand, a majority of the legislature must have thought elk ranching would
also be good for the economy, because they made it every bit as legitimate and protected as cattle
ranching. A curious thing, perhaps, but nonetheless one committed squarely to the legislature
and it is not for the judiciary to pass on the wisdom of the legislature'S constitutional enactments:
The principle which allows the legislature to modify the rules of the
common law is not a recent change in the law of this jurisdiction. In Moon v.
Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944), the Supreme Court stated, "[W]e
must recognize that it is the province of the Legislature, and not of the court, to
modify the rules of the common law." 65 Idaho at 607, 151 P.2d at 771. This

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 26

principle certainly is not unique to Idaho. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court stated:
The Minnesota Supreme Court may be correct that the act is not a sensible
means of conserving energy. But we reiterate that "it is up to the legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."
101 S.Ct. at 726.
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co. 117 Idaho 706, 717-718, 791 P.2d 1285,1296 -1297 (1990).

This Court's opinion in Wheeler bears repeating:
"[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 125
Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also must
take account of all other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed
interpretations and the policy behind the statute."
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263, 207 P.3d 988, 994 (2009).

When all sections of the applicable statutes are considered, along with the relative
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, I.e. §25-2705A (3) simply admits of no "kill 'em
all!" gloss whatsoever: The animals are livestock; their products are agricultural products; their
owners are farmers, breeders or ranchers and the facilities whence they might escape are farms
or ranches. I.C. § 25-3701. All the functions of Fish and Game affecting any phase of elk

ranching have been stripped from Fish and Game and transferred to the Department of
Agriculture and its Administrator of the Division of Animal Industries. I.C. § 25-3702. All of
the provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Title 25 ("Animals") of the Idaho Code that are
applicable to livestock generally are applicable to elk livestock, too.

I.C. § 25-3703.

Governmental authority, as distinct from the immunity given to Joe Hunter, is limited to
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regaining control of the livestock after escape. Nothing short of a true disease emergency,
IDAPA 02.04.19.304.01, IDAPA 02.04.19.305, constitutes an authorized cause for killing of the
livestock by the State, 11 and then only where the same is determined, which is accomplished by
actual testing. IDAPA 02.04.19.304.01, IDAPA 02.04.19.305.01. The penalties authorized for
violations of the elk ranching statutes are limited to fines and civil actions to collect them, as
well as misdemeanor penalties. However, "No civil penalty may be assessed against a person

unless the person was given notice and opportunity for hearing" pursuant to the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act and the imposition of monetary penalties "shall" take into
account not only the seriousness of the violation but also "good faith efforts to comply with the
law, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator and such other matters as justice
requires." I.e. § 25-3706; IDAPA 02.04.19.990.01. And as mentioned before, it's almost as if
the legislature saw Fish and Game, the governor-then-senator and the lower court all coming in
this exact case and specifically warned them against it:

Domestic cervidae shall be, together with their offspring and increases the subject
of ownership, lien and absolute property rights, (the same as purely domestic
animals) in whatever situation, location, or condition such animals may thereafter
become, or be, and regardless of their remaining in, or escaping from such
restraint or captivity.

11 Which is one reason why the lower court's unfounded "believed to be diseased" offering in its
April 29, 2009, Order Re: Motion to Dismiss at 14-15 (R., p. 119-120) is so inexcusable.
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It can be said without exaggeration that all of the pertinent administrative rules are

consistent with plaintiffs interpretation and fatal to the defendants' and the lower court's, too.
The elk ranching program is to be supervised not by Fish and Game staffers but by a "veterinary
medical officer." IDAPA 02.04.19.070. In fact, the only role given to Fish and Game in the
event domestic elk get out is that the Administrator of Animal Industries is to notify them of it.
IDAPA 02.04.19.204.02. And when ranch elk get out,12 then in the event the rancher can't get
them back where they belong within 24 hours, the Administrator is authorized to notify the
county sheriff or the state brand inspector -- pursuant to the chapter devoted to stray livestock:
When domestic cervidae escape from a domestic cervidae ranch and the owner or
operator is unable to retrieve the animals within twenty-four (24) hours, the
Administrator may notify the county sheriff or the state brand inspector of the
escape pursuant to Title 25, Chapter 23, Idaho Code.

IDAPA 02.04.19.204.04. Chapter 23, of course, is entitled "Estrays" and it is replete with due
process - as well as care of the owner's livestock until he settles up for their capture and keeping.
Finally, the applicable administrative rules, like the statutes themselves, treat Joe Hunter
and the State of Idaho very differently in terms of what each may do with an elk rancher's strays.
As respects the State ofIdaho:
05. Capture. In the event that the owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch
is unable to retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, as determined
by the Administrator, the Administrator may effectuate the capture of the
escaped domestic cervidae to ensure the health of Idaho's livestock and wild
cervidae populations. (4-2-03)
See testimony of Mark Hyndman, one of the Division's investigators for nearly 30 years, that
as a general proposition, "it wasn't unexpected, no," that they would occasionally get out.
Hyndman depo., 16110 - 25. (R., p. 304.)
12
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And as respects a licensed hunter:
07. Taking of Escaped Domestic Cervidae. A licensed hunter may legally take
domestic cervidae which have escaped from a domestic cervidae ranch only under
the following conditions:
a. The domestic cervidae has escaped and has not been in the control of the owner
or operator of the domestic cervidae ranch for more than seven (7) days; and
b. The hunter is licensed and in compliance with all the provisions of the Idaho
Department of Fish and Game rules and code. (4-6-05)
IDAP A 02.04.19.204.
It is respectfully submitted that when interpreted in accordance with the rules set forth in

this Court's decision in Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263, 207
P.3d 988, 994 (2009), I.C. §25-3705A affords no authority whatsoever for the defendants'
sensational destruction of plaintiffs livestock.

Because the defendants destroyed plaitiffs

property without any legal authority to do so, the lower court's entry of summary judgment for
them must be reversed.
2.
Genuine issues of material fact foreclosed entry of summary judgment on the
proposition defendants presented to the court below, viz:
The question that is now renewed on this motion for summary judgment is
whether the [plaintiffs] can sustain their taking claims in the face of evidence
presented by the defendants that the [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture their
escaped animals within a reasonable time created a public nuisance that the
defendants were entitled to abate without the payment of any compensation to
the [plaintiffs].
Genuine issues of material fact foreclose entry of summary judgment.

Linsey v. Cook,

139 Idaho 568, 82 P.3d 850, (2003). To begin with, however, there is nothing anywhere in the
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applicable law that supports the proposition that domestic elk become a "public nuisance" simply
for being "out" for any period of time, anyway. The whole "nuisance" concept in this case arose
purely as a function of the lower court's gratuitous observation "there is also the common law
doctrine of nuisance abatement" in footnote 7 of its April 29, 2009, Order Re: Motion to
Dismiss. (R., p. 114.) What does or doesn't follow as a result of livestock remaining at large for
any period of time is determined by the statutes and administrative rules addressed above. Since
defendants have taken the position this case involves the abatement of a public nuisance for
plaintiff's inability to retrieve all of his stock "within a reasonable time," however, plaintiff
would hoist them on their own petard: What is a "reasonable time" is necessarily a question of
fact:
What constitutes a reasonable time within the facts of a given case is a question of
fact to be determined by the trier of fact. In at least two cases, not involving the
issue of the reasonableness of time of forbearance but cases involving the issue of
reasonableness of time, we have said such an issue is a question of fact. Keller v.
Hummel, 334 N.W.2d 200, 203 (N.D.1983); Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec,
236 N.W.2d 900, 907 (N.D. 1975).

Farmers Union Oil Co. of New England v. Maixner 376 N.W.2d 43, 48 (N.D. 1985). And
although plaintiffs stray stock most certainly did not become any public nuisance, the timeliness
of plaintiff's retrieval efforts - which were in fact achieving the desired results, albeit not as
quickly as plaintiff would have liked - most certainly did present a fact question because what is
"a timely manner," IDAPA 02.04.19.204.05, depends on the circumstances. Dr. Ledbetter, the
Administrator who is charged with making that determination, said so:

14

Q.

23
All right. I've got here, Doctor, Idaho
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Administrative Procedure Act Rule 02.04.19, which is
the domestic Cervidae part; and then this particular
rule is 204, "Escape of Domestic Cervidae," and then
subpart 05 reads as follows:
"Capture. In the event that the
owner or operator of a domestic
Cervidae ranch is unable to retrieve
escaped domestic Cervidae in a timely
manner, as determined by the
administrator, the administrator may
effectuate the capture of the escaped
24
domestic Cervidae to ensure the
health of Idaho's livestock and wild
Cervidae populations."
Does that comport with your understanding
of what the power of the administrator was?
A. I believe so. I did not recall that
the -- about protecting the health of the wild
population because -- that -- that -- that's
interesting. I just did not recall that part of that.
Q. Your understanding was that it was to
protect the domestic Cervidae?
A. Yeah. I just -- I did not remember that.
Q. All right. Fair enough. But do you
recall that, as administrator, you were given the
power to determine whether the grower had failed to
recapture them in what would be a timely manner?
A. Yeah.
Q. And would timeliness depend on the
circumstances?
A. Oh, I'm sure. I mean any - all of those
kinds of things would have weighed into any decision
that would have been made about that, yes.
Q. Some presumably would be easier to get
backA. Oh, sure.
25
Q. - than others might?
A. Sure.
Q. All right. And then in the event that you

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 32

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

had determined that, based on the circumstances, the
grower had failed to recapture them in a timely
manner, then you were authorized, were you not, to
effectuate the capture of the escaped domestic
Cervidae yourselves?
A. (Witness nods head.) Yes. We had staff
that had worked with elk, worked with the breeders,
the growers, quite a bit and had some experience.
Q. And they presumably had expertise in how
to recapture domestic Cervidae, did they -- or at
least some experience?
A. They had experience handling them as far
as working with the growers, the farmers, the
breeders, when they would do inventories and things
like that; but I don't know that any of them had ever
gone out and actually tried to capture an escaped
one. Honestly don't remember.
Q. Okay.
A. Don't know if they'd ever even been sent
out -- I just don't recall that that had ever come up.
Q. Sure. Butfor a merefailure of the
grower to be able to recapture them in a timely
26
manner, nothing in the rules authorized to go out and
kill them on that basis alone, did it?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Do I understand correctly that these
escaped domestic Cervidae were hanging out, for lack
of a better word, primarily on Ms. Albertson's alfalfa
pasture and other private property?
A. I believe that was -- was what her
statement was, that they were just, you know, hanging
out in her hay field and had been hanging out for a
week or so, and --

Ledbetter depo., 23/14

26/11 (R., p. 271 - 272).

And contrary to the politicos' screaming declaration of an "immediate threat to the health
of wild elk herds of the State of Idaho and surrounding States from elk that have escaped from
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[plaintiffs] facility," (Executive Order, R., p. 32-33), Dr. Ledbetter, D.V.M. -

who knows

more than just a little bit about elk, certainly - testified as follows:
43
21 Q. How would you, as the administrator ofthe
22 Division of Animal Industries, quantify the risk, if
23 any, that domestic Cervidae would present to wild elk?
24
A. We always maintained that those facilities
25 that had good records, that we could document the
44
1 testing that had happened coming in, we knew about the
2 animal movements, we had good inventory controls, we
3 had all of those things, good animal identification,
4 that we could make those statements. We had always
5 maintained that the whole time I was there.
6
Q. That there was no risk?
7
A. There was a minimal risk.
8
Q. Okay.
9
A. I mean I don't know that we could ever say
10 no, zero. You know, all depends on how good your
11 tests are.
But there was just really -- I think the
12
13 Ag Department/eft that,/or the most part, the
14 hysteria that was going on - and I think that's the

15 best way I can describe it - within the various
16 sportsmen's groups, and I think we saw it play out a

17 couple different years in the statehouse with various
18 bills13 - was blown out 0/proportion, and it was blown
19 out of proportion by misstatements like this
20 (indicating).

Ledbetter depo., 43/21-44120. (R., p. 276.)
Because timeliness of the grower's capture efforts is a determination to be made by the
Administrator; because his determination of timeliness would depend on the circumstances;

13

Bills that failed, obviously.
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because he was never even asked to make a detennination of timeliness; because even a
detennination the grower hadfailed to retrieve his stock in a timely manner would warrant only
the State's effectuation of capture; and because nothing in the applicable rules would authorize
the State to kill the strays simply for the grower's failure to retrieve them in a timely manner,
anyway, the lower court's entry of summary judgment must be reversed.
3.
The State's taking ofplaintifrs livestock entitles him to just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as a matter oflaw.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Such compensation
means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the propertv taken. FN8 The
owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken. FN9
FN8 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 13 S.Ct.
622,626,37 L.Ed. 463.
FN9 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354,
355,67 L.Ed. 664; United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343,
43 S.Ct. 565, 566,67 L.Ed. 1014.
It is conceivable that an owner's indemnity should be measured in various
ways depending upon the circumstances of each case and that no general fonnula
should be used for the purpose. In an effort, however, to find some practical
standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of market value.
The owner has been said to be entitled to the 'value' ,FNIO the 'market value' ,fNll
and the 'fair market value' FN12 of what is taken. The tenn 'fair' hardly adds
anything to the phrase 'market value', which denotes what 'it fairly may be
believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given', FN13 or,
more concisely, 'market value fairly detennined'. FN14
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FNlO Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574, 17 S.Ct. 966, 976, 42 L.Ed. 270.

FN11 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408, 25 L.Ed. 206; United States v.
New River Collieries Co., supra, 262 U.S. 344, 43 S.Ct. 567, 67 L.Ed. 1014.

FN12 Orgel, 'Valuation under Eminent Domain' (p. 56): 'The owner must be
compensated for what is taken from him, but that is done when he is paid its fair
market value for all available uses and purposes.' United States v. ChandlerDunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81, 33 S.Ct. 667, 678, 57 L.Ed. 1063.

FN13 New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57,61,36 S.Ct. 25, 26, 60 L.Ed. 143.
FN14 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,255,54 S.Ct. 704, 708, 78 L.Ed.
1236.

us. v. Miller,

317 U.S. 369,373-374,63 S.Ct. 276, 279 - 280 (1943), emphasis added.

As defendants conceded in their summary judgment briefing,
The executive order, as based upon this statue, made it clear that the state
of Idaho intentionally authorized the "take" of the animals that had escaped from
the {plaintiffs,] domestic elk farm, without the payment of any compensation to the
{plantiffsJ for any of those animals that were subsequently taken as a result of that
hunt.

Defendants' initial brief in support of summary judgment at 17, emphasis added CR., p. 230.)
Because the State took plaintiff's private property, it has to pay him just compensation. Such
compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. Miller, 317
U.S. at 373.

4.
Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for defendant Risch
on plaintiff's 42 U.S.c. §1983 claim for violation of plaintiff's clearly established right to
the ownership and enjoyment of his livestock.
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The case of Jackson v. City 0/ Pittsburg, decided in 2010 by the federal district court for
the Northern District of California (and apparently reported only at 2010 WL 2347085, 6 -7),
contains a succinct statement of the law requiring reversal of the lower court's entry of summary
judgment on plaintiffs §1983 claims against the individual defendants:

The doctrine of

qualified immunity shields persons acting under color of law from liability for civil damages
only so long as the conduct doesn't violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). A right is "clearly established" if "it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Wilkins v. City

o/Oakland, 350 F.3d 949,954 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis in original). An officer will therefor~ be
entitled to qualified immunity even if he was mistaken in his belief that his conduct was lawful,

so long as that belie/was reasonable." Id. at 955, emphasis added.
In this case, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the individual
defendants' claimed belief in the legality of the governor's executive order to "immediately
identify and shoot on site any domestic elk that have escaped from [plaintiffs] facility" was
reasonable under the circumstances, precluding summary judgment on the ground of qualified
immunity. At the least, whether the officials may be said to have made a "reasonable mistake"
of fact or law may depend on the jury's resolution of disputed facts regarding comparison of the
governor's executive order (R., p. 32-33, appended hereto) with the statutes and rules collected in
the Appendix. Be that as it may, it is submitted that no one could reasonably take I.C. 253705A, particularly in context with the other pertinent statutes and administrative rules, to
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authorize the executive order or the carnage carried out in accordance with its directive. The
lower court's entry of summary judgment must be reversed in any event.

5.
The lower court's award of attorney fees to defendants on the stated ground
plaintiffs case was pursued "frivolously" or "without basis in law or fact" was plain error.
The lower court's antagonism toward this case was palpable. Whether it stemmed from
its continuing affinity for its former associates at Fish and Game, from its view of elk ranching
or from its perceptions of the elk rancher is unknown.

But the court's ipse dixit refusal to

consider plaintiff's arguments, only to then declare them "frivolous," must have occurred for
some reason that simply isn't borne out by the involved facts and law. For the reasons set forth
in plaintiffs motion to disallow defendants' claimed costs and attorney fees, together with the
supporting affidavit and brief (R., p. 608

659) the lower court's award of attorney fees and

entry of its "supplemental judgment" for roughly $50,000.00 must be reversed. To the extent it,
like defendants' counterclaim, was intended by them as a deterrent to appellate review of what
occurred here, it has failed of its intended purpose, anyway.

6.

The case should be reassigned on remand.
Given the passionate institutional animosity of Fish and Game toward elk ranching,

replete with its department-wide dissemination of various anti-ranching articles by its then
Bureau Chief of Communications, Roger Fuhrman, and given the lower court's former job as a
fish and game attorney, the case should be reassigned on remand.
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Conclusion
We are a government of laws, not men or women, and the laws that govern this case
clearly preclude what has occurred in it - relative popularity notwithstanding. The Judgment and
Supplemental Judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the case remanded for trial in a
different court.
Respectfully submitted

~J

thi~ day of September, 2011.

atrick D. Furey, Attorney at Law
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant
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ADDENDUM

Title 25, Chapter 37
Domestic Cervidae Farms

APPENDIX

Page 20f8

Westlaw,
Page 1

West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness
Title 25. Animals
... Chapter 37. Domestic Cervidae Farms (Refs & Annos)
§ 25-3701. Domestic cervidae farming deemed agricultural pursuit
It shall be lawful for any person, association or corporation to breed, own or control domest-

ic cervidae, which are defined as fallow deer (dama dama), elk (cervus eJaphus) or reindeer
(rangifer tarandus), but shall not include red deer (urasian cervidae) or any subspecies or hybrids thereof, and hold such animal in captivity for breeding or other useful purposes on domestic cervidae farms or ranches, provided the premises have been registered with the division of animal industries. Reindeer (rangifer tarandus) shall not be held for domestic purposes north of the Salmon River. For the purposes of all classification and administration of
the laws of the state ofldaho, and all administrative orders and rules pertaining thereto, the
breeding, raising, producing, harvesting or marketing of such animals or their products by
the producer or his agent shall be deemed an agricultural pursuit; such animals shall be
deemed livestock and their products shall be deemed agricultural products; the persons engaged in such agricultural pursuits shall be deemed farmers, cervidae farmers, cervidae
breeders or cervidae ranchers; the premises within which such pursuit is conducted shall be
deemed farms, cervidae farms, or cervidae ranches.

§ 25-3702. Transfer of functions from fish and game commission to department of agriculture
All the functions of the fish and game commission and the department of fish and game,
which affect the breeding, raising, producing, marketing, or any other phase of the production or distribution, of domestic cervidae, or the products thereof, are hereby transfened to
and vested in the department of agriculture and the administrator of the division of animal
industries; provided, that this act shall not limit or affect the powers or duties ofthe department of fish and ~ame relating to nondomestic cervidae or the management and taking
thereof, and provlded further that the department of agriculture shall address the reasonable
concerns of the department of fish and game respecting the domestic farming of cervidae as
provided in section 36-1 06(e )(9), Idaho Code.

§ 25-3703. Application of laws relating to livestock and domestic animals
All of the provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6, title 25, Idaho Code, applicable to livestock
and domestic animals, except those provisions which by their terms are restricted to swine,
bovine animals, dairy or breeding cattle, or range cattle, or other particular kind or kinds of
livestock and domestic animals to the exclusion oflivestock or domestic animals generally,
are applicable to domestic cervidae.

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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§ 25-3703A. Official permanent identification
All domestic cervidae located in Idaho shall be identified with two (2) types of official permanent identification. At least one (l) of the official permanent identifications shall be visible from a minimum of one hundred fifty (150) feet.

§ 25-3704. Rules for registering premises and disease prevention
The administrator of the division of animal industries is hereby authorized and empowered
to make, promulgate, and enforce general and reasonable rules not inconsistent with law, for
the registration of domestic cervidae farm or ranch premises, and for the prevention of the
introduction or dissemination of diseases among domestic cervidae of this state, and to otherwise effectuate enforcement of the provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and 37, title 25, Idaho
Code, applicable to domestic cervidae.

§ 25-3705. Inspection of cervidae farms
The division of animal industries and any of its officers shall have the right, at any reasonable time, to inspect any domestic cervidae farm, and may go upon such farms or any part
thereofwhere such animals are contained to inspect and examine the same and any animals
therein.

§ 25-3705A. Escape of domestic ccrvidae
(l) It is the duty of the owners and operators of domestic cervidae farms or ranches to:

(a) Take all reasonable actions to prevent the escape of domestic cervidae located on such
farms or ranches;
(b) Ensure that perimeter fences and gates are built and maintained in a manner that will
prevent the escape of domestic cervidae;
(c) Notify the division of animal industries upon the discovery of the escape of domestic
cervidae; and
(d) Take reasonable actions to bring under control domestic cervidae that escape.
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the division of animal industries or
its agent is authorized to take necessary actions to bring under control any domestic cervidae
that have escaped the control of the owner or operator of the domestic cervidae farm or
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx ?fl1= top&rs=WL W 11 .07 &p bc=25 F 1C3 8...
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ranch where the domestic cervidae were located.
(3) Any domestic cervidae, that have escaped the control of the owner or operator of a domestic cervidae farm or ranch for more than seven (7) days, taken by a licensed hunter in a
manner which complies with title 36, Idaho Code, and the rules and proclamations of the
Idaho fish and game commission shall be considered a legal taking and neither the licensed
hunter, the state, nor any state agency shall be liable to the owner for killing the escaped domestic cervidae.

§ 25-3705B. Wild ungulates
The Idaho department of fish and game shall cooperate with the division of animal industries and the owner or operator of any domestic cervidae farm or ranch, where any wild ungulates are found within the perimeter fences of the domestic cervidae farm or ranch, in the
development of a site specific written herd plan to determine the disposition of the wild ungulates.

§ 25-3706. Violations--Civil--Criminal--Penalties for violations
(1) Failure to comply with provisions applicable to domestic cervidac as set forth in chapters
2, 3, 4 and 6 oftitle 25, Idaho Code, the provisions ofthis chapter, or rules promulgated
thereunder, shall constitute a violation. Civil penalties may be assessed agamst a violator as
follows:

(a) A civil penalty as assessed by the department or its duly authorized agent not to exceed
five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each offense;
(b) Assessment of a civil penalty may be made in conjunction with any other department administrative action.
(2) No civil penalty may be assessed against a person unless the person was given notice and
opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the Idaho administrative procedure act as set forth in
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
(3) If the department is unable to collect an assessed civil penalty, or jf a person fails to pay
all or a. set portion of an assessed civil penalty as detennined by the depatiment, the department may file an action to recover the civil penalty in the district court of the county in
which the violation is alleged to have occurred. In addition to the assessed penalty, the department shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in such action or on appeal from such action.
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?fn= _top&rs=WLWl 1.07&pbc=25Fl C38...

9/21/2011

Page 70f8
Page 4

(4) A person against whom the department has assessed a civil penalty under this section
may, within thirty (30) days of the final agency action making the assessment, appeal the assessment to the district court of the county in which the violation is alleged to have oc- cUlTed.
(5) Moneys collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the state treasury and
credited to the livestock disease control and T.B. indemnity fund.
(6) The imposition or computation of monetary penalties shall take into account the seriousness of the violation, good faith efforts to comply with the law, the economic impact of the
penalty on the violator and such other matters as justice requires.
(7) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the director to report minor violations when the director believes that the public interest will be best served by suitable warnings or other administrative action.
(8) Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6,
title 25, Idaho Code, this chapter, or rules promulgated thereunder by the division of animal
industries, afplicable to domestic cervidae, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shal be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than
five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each offense.

§ 25-3707. Property rights in domestic cervidae
Domestic cervidae shall be, together with their offspring and increases the su~ject of ownership, lien and absolute property rights, (the same as purely domestic animals) in whatever
situation, location, or condition such animals may thereafter become, or be, and regardless
of their remaining in, or escaping from such restraint or captivity.

§ 25-3708. Fees
There is hereby imposed, on domestic cervidae, a fee, not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) per
head per year and shall be due on January 1 of each year. The fee shall be used by the Idaho
department of agriculture, division of animal industries, for the prevention, control and eradication of diseases of domestic cervidae, the inspection of domestic cervidae and domestic
cervidae farms or ranches, and administration of the domestic cervidae program. All moneys
collected under this provision shall be deposited in the livestock disease control and tuberculosis indemnity fund and used for the domestic cervidae program.

§ 25-3709. Severability
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orip;. US Gov. Works.
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If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions of application of the act which can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this act are declared to be severable.

END OF DOCUMENT
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Idaho Administrative Procedure Act
Rules Governing the Domestic Cervidae Program

APPENDIX

070. SUPERVISION OF DOMESTIC CERVIDAE PROGRAM.

A department veterinary medical officer shall provide routine supervision of the domestic
cervidae program. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.070

204. ESCAPE OF DOMESTIC CERVIDAE.
It shall be the duty of each owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch to take all reasonable

actions to prevent the escape of domestic cervidae from a domestic cervidae ranch. (4-6-05)
01. Notification of Escape. When any domestic cervidae escape from a domestic cervidae
ranch, the owner or operator of the domestic cervidae ranch shall notify the Administrator by
phone, facsimile, or other means approved by the administrator within twenty-four (24) hours of
the discovery of the escape. (4-6-05)
02. Duty to Retrieve Escaped Cervidae. It shall be the duty of each owner or operator of a
domestic cervidae ranch to retrieve or otherwise bring under control all domestic cervidae that
escape from a domestic cervidae ranch. (4-2-03)
03. Fish and Game. The Administrator shall notify the Idaho Department of Fish and Game of
each escape. (4-2-03)
04. Sheriff and State Brand Inspector. When domestic cervidae escape from a domestic
cervidae ranch and the owner or operator is unable to retrieve the animals within twenty-four
(24) hours, the Administrator may notify the county sheriff or the state brand inspector of the
escape pursuant to Title 25, Chapter 23, Idaho Code. (4-2-03)
05. Capture. In the event that the owner or operator of a domestiC cervidae ranch is unable to
retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, as determined by the Administrator, the
Administrator may effectuate the capture of the escaped domestic cervidae to ensure the health
of Idaho's livestock and wild cervidae populations. (4-2-03)
06. Failure to Notify. Failure of any owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch to notify
the Administrator within twenty-four (24) hours of the discovery of an escape of domestic
cervidae is a violation of this chapter. (4-6-05)
07. Taking of Escaped Domestic Cervidae. A licensed hunter may legally take domestic
cervidae which have escaped from a domestic cervidae ranch only under the following
conditions: (4-6-05)

a. The domestic cervidae has escaped and has not been in the control of the owner or operator
of the domestic cervidae ranch for more than seven (7) days; and( 4-6-05)

b. The hunter is licensed and in compliance with all the provisions of the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game rules and code. (4-6-05)
IDAPA 02.04.19.204

300. DISEASE CONTROL

The Administrator may require domestic cervidae in the state to be tested for brucellosis
(Brucella abortus or Brucella suis), tuberculosis (Mycobacterium bovis), meningeal worm
(Parelaphostrongylus tenuis), muscle worm (Elaphostrongylus cervus), CWD or for other
diseases or parasites determined to pose a risk to other domestic cervidae, livestock, or wildlife.
(4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.300

301. DUTY TO RESTRAIN.
It shall be the duty of the owner of each domestic cervidae ranch to gather and restrain domestic
cervidae for testing when directed to do so in writing by the Administrator. The Administrator
shall determine the suitability of the restraint system. (4-2-03)

IDAPA 02.04.19.301

302. TESTING METHODS.

The Administrator shall determine appropriate testing procedures and methods. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.302

303. TESTING, TREATMENT, QUARANTINE, OR DISPOSAL REQUIRED.

The Administrator shall determine when testing, treatment, quarantine, or disposal of domestic
cervidae is required at any domestic cervidae ranch pursuant to Title 25, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and
[37] 35, Idaho Code. If the Administrator determines that testing, treatment, quarantine,
disposal of domestic cervidae, or cleaning or disinfection of premises is required, a written order
shall be issued to the owner describing the procedure to be followed and the time period for
carrying out such actions. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.303

304. QUARANTINES.

All domestic cervidae animals or herds that are determined to be exposed to, or infected with,
any disease that constitutes an emergency, as provided in Title 25, Chapter 2, Idaho Code, shall
be quarantined. (4-2-03)
01. Infected Herds. Infected herds or animals shall remain under quarantine until such time
that the herd has been completely depopulated and the premises has been cleaned and
disinfected as provided by the Administrator, or the provisions for release of a quarantine
established in these rules have been met. (4-6-05)
02. Exposed Herds. The quarantine for exposed herds or animals may take the form of a holdorder which shall remain in effect until the exposed animals have been tested and the provisions
for release of a quarantine as established in these rules have been met. (4-2-03)

03. Validity of Quarantine. The quarantine shall be valid whether or not acknowledged by
signature of the owner. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.304

305. DECLARATION OF ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY.
The Director is authorized to declare an animal health emergency. (4-2-03)
01. Condemnation of Animals. In the event that the Director determines that an emergency
exists, animals that are found to be infected, or affected with, or exposed to an animal health
emergency disease may be condemned and destroyed. (4-2-03)
02. Indemnity. Any indemnity shall be paid in accordance with Sections 25-212 and 25-213,
Idaho Code. (4-2-03)
03. Notification to Administrator. Every owner of cervidae, every breeder or dealer in
cervidae, every veterinarian, and anyone bringing cervidae into this state who observes the
appearance of, or signs of any disease or diseases, or who has knowledge of exposure of the
cervidae to diseases that constitute an emergency shall give immediate notice to the
Administrator by telephone, facsimile, or other means as approved by the Administrator. (4-605)
04. Failure to Notify. Any owner of cervidae who fails to report as herein provided shall forfeit
all claims for indemnity for animals condemned and slaughtered or destroyed on account of the
animal health emergency. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.305

990. PENALTV FOR VIOLATIONS.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this Chapter shall be subject to the penalty
provisions of Title 25, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, and [35] 37, Idaho Code, applicable to domestic
cervidae. (4-2-03)
01. Monetary Penalties. The imposition or computation of monetary penalties shall take into
account the seriousness of the violation, good faith efforts to comply with the law, the economic
impact of the penalty on the violator and such other matters as justice requires. (4-2-03)
02. Minor Violations. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as requiring the director to
report minor violations when the director believes that the public interest will be best served by
suitable warnings or other administrative action. (4-2-03)
IDAPA 02.04.19.990

Title 25, Chapter 23
Estrays
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Westlaw.
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West's Idaho Code Almotated Currentness
Title 25. Animals
.... Chapter 23. Estrays
§ 25-2301. Stray or estray defined
Stray or estray means any livestock whose owner is unknown or cannot be located, or any
livestock whose owner is known but who pennits livestock to roam at large on public or
private lands contrary to law or regulation and without permission.

§ 25-2302. Duty of sheriff or brand inspector
When a sheriff or brand inspector finds stray livestock or stray livestock are reported to him,
he shall attempt to locate the owner and to notify the owner where the livestOCK may be
found. If the owner refuses to, or does not take possession of the livestock within five (5)
days after being notified of the location of the livestock, or if the owner is unknown or cannot be located, the sheriff or brand inspector shall seize the livestock or have some person
hold and care for the livestock on behalf of the sheriff or brand inspector and the sheriff or
brand inspector shall proceed to sell the livestock at a local public livestock market as
provided for by law to the highest bidder for cash, after giving at least fifteen (15) days public notice of the sale.

§ 25-2303. Notification
If a recognized brand or mark is found on stray livestock, the owner shall be notified by the
best method available. If an unrecognized brand or brands or other marks are found on stray
livestock, the local brand inspector or the state brand board shall be notified by the best
method available.

§ 25-2304. Notice of sale
Notice of the sale shall be given by advertising the stray livestock for sale at least twice in a
daily newspaper of general circulation in the area where the livestock was found and is being held. The notice shall describe the livestock by giving number, marks, brands, approximate age, sex and any other distinguishing characteristics, and the notice shall descnbe
when and where the livestock will be sold.

§ 25-2305. Notice of sale to owner
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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If the owner of the stray livestock is known and can be located, a copy of the notice of sale
shall be served upon the owner at least fifteen (15) days before the date of the sale. Service
of the notice may be made by certified or registered mail.

§ 25-2306. Claiming of stray livestock
The owner of the stray livestock may take possession of the livestock at any time prior to
sale by proving ownership andraying the costs relative to taking up and caring for the animal or animals and the costs 0 advertising, inspection. etc., as set forth in section 25-2309,
Idaho Code.

§ 25-2307. Removal without payment prohibited
Removal of the estray livestock from the custody of the sheriff, brand inspector or any person holding the estray livestock for the sheriff or brand inspector without payment in full of
all charges or costs that have been incurred under this chapter shall be a misdemeanor and
the livestock may be recovered to be disposed of as provided for by this chapter by the sheriff, brand inspector or person authorized by either of them to hold the estray livestock.

§ 25-2308. Sale of unclaimed animals
If the owner of stray livestock does not claim the animals before the day of sale or if the
owner is unknown or cannot be located. the sheriff or brand inspector shall have the livestock sold pursuant to the notice of sale and shall execute and deliver a brand inspection certificate to the purchaser, stating that the livestock has been sold as estray to the purchaser.
which certificate may thereafter be used by the purchaser to show ownership of the livestock
sold.

§ 25-2309. Charges for care, advertising and sale
The sheriff, brand inspector or person authorized by either of them to feed and care for stray
livestock shall receive all actual expenses incurred; but food and care shall not be charged at
a rate to exceed two dollars ($2.00) per head per day for cattle and horses nor more than seventy-five cents (75¢) per head per day for other animals from the time that the sheriff or
brand inspector is notified that the livestock has been taken up as estray. The sheriff or
brand inspector or livestock market shall receive like costs for any time during which the
livestock are in their possession. The sheriff or brand inspector may also charge and receive
mileage and inspection fees for inspecting any estray livestock for the purpose of detennining ownership of the livestock at the rates provided for by law or regulation. Also, standard
fees shall be payable for sale by the livestock market and for health and brand inspection
and assessments or taxes for sale of livestock as provided for by law.
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§ 25-2310. Disposition of worthless estrays
If in the judgment of a sheriff or brand inspector estray livestock is of no value or its value
would be less than the cost of feed, care and sale ofthe livestock under this chapter, the
sheriff or brand inspector may dispose of the livestock by private sale or by slaughter. If the
0\v11er of such livestock is known, he shall be personally notified of the proposed disposition
of the livestock at least three (3) days before the livestock is privately sold or slaughtered.
The owner may claim such livestock by paying the expenses incurred against it.

§ 25-2311. Sale by brand inspector
If the estray livestock is sold by a brand inspector, he shall immediately advise the state
brand inspector of all the particulars of the matter and account for the proceeds and forward
the net proceeds of the sale to the state brand inspector to be placed in the unclaimed livestock account, to be handled as provided for by sections 25-1173 and 25-1174, Idaho Code,
and the rules and regulations of the state brand board. The previous owner of the animal
may make claim for the net proceeds as provided for by sections 25-1173 and 25-1174,
Idaho Code.

§ 25-2312. Sale by sheriff--Subsequent claims
If the estray livestock is sold by a sheriff, after deducting the costs provided for by this
chapter, particularly by section 25-2309, Tdaho Code, the net proceeds of the sale shall be
forwarded to the county treasurer and the county treasurer shall hold the proceeds of the sale
for six (6) months. At any time within the six (6) month period, any person claiming to be
the owner of the animal sold may recover the net funds of the sale from the county treasurer
by producing proof that the animal or allimals were his property. Said proof shall be made
before the sheriff who made the sale or his successor in office and for such purpose the sheriff is empowered to administer oaths to the claimant or his witnesses. Upon making such
proof, the sheriff shall give the claimant an order on the county treasurer, which order shall
be retained until the six (6) month period has expired. If such claimant is the only person
claiming the livestock, the county treasurer shall turn over such moneys to the claimant. If,
however, there be more than one claimant for said moneys, then such contesting claimants
must bring an action within three (3) months to determine who is the owner of the livestock
sold. The action shall be brought in the magistrate or district court having jurisdiction of the
matter. The claimant receiving judgment in his favor shall be entitled to said moneys. Tn
case the ownership of the livestock be not proved, or there are no claims as to the ownership
of such livestock within the time provided, then the moneys in the hands of the county treasurer shall be forfeited to the school district where said animal or animals were taken up and
shall, by the county treasurer, be turned over to such school district for the use of the school
district.
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FXECtmV1t J'JErARrMfl/'V1'
STA1'F.O,"'/l).I;HO
INNSF.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NQ. 1.006-.12
AUTHORIZING THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICVLTURE TO DEAL WITH DOMESTIC ELK THAT HAVE
ESCAPED FROM REX RAMMEL'S CONANT CREEK FAClUTY
WHEREAS, Ihe State is l'e.cpon<ihiefor pr~se,.vi"g, pro/Octing, perpetuating and
managing the wild elk herds of Idaho; ond
WHEREAS, there is imminenl threat /0 the hell/th ,,(wild dk herds ofthl? Stale of Idaho
alld surrounding SUltas from d()mestic elk that have escaped/rom Rex Rammel '..0 Conant Creek
Facility (Conant Creek Facilit)!); and
WHEREAS, thac~, an imminent Ihreat to public health and saftt)' aflhe citizens of
fdaho as well as neighboring slates due to the escape ofdomestic elk from the COrlant Creek
Facility,' and
WHEREAS, Ihere is also an imminent Ihreai ofdaml1!J" to {Yubllc and private propert),
.from Ihe domestic elk that have escl1(Jf!dfrom Ihe Conant Creek Facility; and
1t1iER£AS, the oWlrer of Ihe privale elk r(mc/', Conant Creck Facility, delayed
notification to the SiaM thai hi., domestic elk had escapr.d; and
WHEREAS, any domeslic elk thai have escaped;rom the Conant Creek Facility
have escaped the confrnl ofth" owner for more than seven (l) dnys:
NOW, THEREFORE, f, .JAMfiS E, RI.SCff, Governor of the State of Idono, by outhnritv
vested in me under the COIt<tirulion and laws o( the State of Idaho do hereby ordet;
i,

That IJS a result of the facts and circumstances described above, the
Idaho Department fir n,h and Game and thc Idaho Department of
Agricu/rure immediately ide/rtftY and ,<hoot on site, any domestic elk thar
have escapedfi'om the COMat Creek Facility; and

2, The Idaho Department of FiBh and Game ana tlte Idaho Department of
Agricultw'l! shall e,xercise all staf!ltory a1Jlitority mcessary to lllke, as
defined under Wle 36 section 202(1} and control as authori2ed under
litle 25, section 3705A and title 36, sectioll 104 o,(the Idaho Code, any
domestic elk that have cscaplldfrom the Conant Creek Facility; and
3, The Idaho Fish and Game Comm,:"ioll shall promu(gote an e",ergencv
rule Or proclamation;
Thai of/ows IicenBed humers ({) identifY and shool on site al1}'
domestic elk that I,ave escaped from the Co"a"t Creek Facility and
possess the carcass of thi! anima! talam: and
b. That allows priMlc property owners to identify and immediately
Idl/ any domestic elk on tileir prtvate propertYlhat have esca(Jf!d
.from the COMnt Creek Facility and po,.sess the carcaSs oflhe
anima/taken; ond
That places no limit 011 the >!lImber of escaped domestic elk from
the Conan! Creek Facility thaI call be taken by al1}' private
property (rwnt;r on their property or licensed hunter; and
d. Requires anvone who takes a domestic elk that has escaped from
the COllan! Creek Facility 10 notifY Ihe idaho Department of Fish
0,

Exhibit -A

and Game willtln liJrf1€ h71sines.'I day.r; of the takfng and provide the.

idenlification numher of Ihe elk to the Department; and
e.

Requests, but does not require, any indfvidlJa[ who lakes ()

domestic elk that has escaped from the Conant Creek Facility
provide

t1

brain) blond and tissue sample

(0

tire Idaho Department

of Fish and Game.
4. Pursuant to tille 25. section 3705A of the Idaho Code no licellSed
h.mter. slate agency, stale employee, nor the State shall be liable for the
taking, posse"sillg or consuming ofany domestic elk that have escoped
from the Conant Creek Foeility: and
5. No private landowner shall he liable for Ihe taking, possessing, or
consuming any domeslic elk on rheir property that have escaped from
the Conant Creek FaeiliOI pursuant to the emergency rule promulgated.

IN WrYNESS WHEREOF, I hme hereunlo set my hand
and caused to be afJUed Ihe Greal Seal of the Siale of
rdaho otlhe (apitol in Boise Oil this trh day o[Seplember
ill the year o[ Our Lord two thousand and six and o[the
lndePandell~e of the Unired S(ate,~ of America the fwD
hundred Ihirtyjirsl and o[ the Siotehood of fdaho Ihe one
hundred ,<evcnreet.th

oc:>(')()
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